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The GrowTh of environmenTal JusTice and 
environmenTal ProTecTion in inTernaTional law: 
in The conTexT of reGulaTion of The arcTic’s offshore oil indusTry
by E.A. Barry-Pheby*
IntroductIon
The Arctic Ocean is surrounded by five coastal states (four of which are heavily industrialised).1 With its short food chain, and low temperatures, the Arctic Ocean is highly 
vulnerable to pollution.2 This marine environment is central to 
Arctic indigenous peoples3 existence: providing food, warmth, 
livelihood and cultural integrity.4 Yet the offshore hydrocarbon 
industry is increasingly exploiting the Arctic Ocean: many activ-
ities are in deeper, and formerly unexplored, territories.5 Rele-
vant international law is not keeping pace, leaving this delicate 
marine environment, and its indig-
enous coastal populations increas-
ingly vulnerable to oil pollution.6
There is greater inclusion of 
international environmental law 
principles and concepts in relevant 
international law yet environ-
mental protection is still severely 
curtailed by weak application 
of the precautionary principle, 
little progression in the creation of 
marine protected areas (“MPA’s”), 
inadequate protection of identified 
species at risk from oil pollution, 
and a sustainable development model weighted heavily towards 
economic development. Similarly, there has been a substantial 
growth of international law affording greater rights to indig-
enous peoples and ground-breaking involvement of indigenous 
peoples in the law-making process. Yet constraints are imposed 
by the failure of key states to ratify relevant international law and 
from limitations of the Arctic Council’s soft law. Examples of 
environmental injustice are found in inadequate public participa-
tion for environmental impact assessments identified as tokenis-
tic, ineffective or untimely, and in distributive inequalities of the 
sustainable development of Arctic coastal states. The tension 
between state sovereignty and international law has caused an 
impasse, which needs to be circumvented to sufficiently support 
environmental protection and environmental justice in regula-
tion of the Arctic’s offshore oil industry.
EnvIronmEntal ProtEctIon
The Arctic faces ongoing degradation from global warm-
ing, ozone depletion, radioactive waste, pollution from persis-
tent organic pollutants, pollution from heavy metals, and oil 
development.7 Oil pollution from the offshore industry has the 
potential to damage marine animals, change migratory patterns, 
destroy flora and halt indigenous peoples subsistence lifestyles.8
The Arctic marine environment is rendered particularly 
vulnerable to oil pollution due to the severe limitations that 
climatological, oceanographic and ecological factors impose on 
oil biodegradation.9 Furthermore, industry clean-up methods are 
rendered difficult, some postulate impossible, due to the Ocean’s 
remoteness, semi-permanent ice cover10 and climatological 
extremes.11 Oil spills in the Arctic marine environment could 
remain unweathered, and toxic, for 
decades.12
With some reticence, the 
offshore industry primarily drills 
only during summer seasons.13 
During the summer season the 
climate may be problematic, with 
“gale force winds, week-long 
storms, and heavy fog restricting 
visibility.”14 While the increasing 
melting of the Arctic summer 
ice is announced with growing 
hysteria,15icebergs, ice packs and 
increased ‘wave and storm action’ 
could present new problems.16
Unfortunately, the heavily anticipated Arctic Council’s 
binding agreement on oil pollution preparedness and response 
may fail to address the salient needs of the Arctic environment. 
In February 2013 Greenpeace leaked the draft agreement and 
heavily criticised the limitations of this piece of draft legislation, 
describing it as “incredibly vague” and “inadequate.”17
Numerous academics acknowledge problems with the pri-
marily soft international law regulating the Arctic.18 The prob-
lems identified relate to: a) the nature of international law (and 
the systemic failures of this particular soft law);19 b) procedural 
failures and weaknesses including inadequate implementation 
procedures, evaluation, outcome targets, follow-up procedures 
and integration of science into practice and policy;20 c) a lack 
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The tension between 
state sovereignty and 
international law has 
caused an impasse
111468_AU_SDLP.indd   48 3/18/13   9:03 AM
492012–2013
of integration of recognized and accepted environmental prin-
ciples and approaches such as ecosystem-based management 
(“EBM”), biodiversity, creation of Marine Protected Areas 
(“MPA”s), sustainable development, the precautionary principle 
and the polluter pays principle;21 and d) a range of other faults 
including lack of funding, many years without an Arctic Council 
permanent secretariat, geopolitical tensions, a resistance by 
coastal states to develop international law and a lack of real inte-
gration of indigenous and other local people’s opinions.22
Soft law can provide more detail, and be quicker and less 
cumbersome to create (as it does not demand domestic ratifica-
tion), than hard law.23 Furthermore, it often supports enhanced 
stakeholder involvement.24 It is also acknowledged that soft law 
has the potential to better address politically sensitive issues, 
allowing for the retention of sovereignty while resulting in the 
integration of the essence of soft law into domestic legislation.25 
Fitzmaurice identifies that soft law can play a “fundamental” 
role in environmental protection.26
The inclusion of international environmental law principles 
and concepts provides, prima facie, a legal foundation for eco-
logical, cultural and scientific perspectives; promotes discourse; 
and potentially raises environmental protection standards.27 
Therefore, the next part will analyze the growth of environmental 
protection in relevant international law by examining the inclu-
sion of international environmental law principles/concepts.28
The PrecauTionary PrinciPle
The precautionary principle is increasingly included in 
international instruments relevant to the Arctic marine envi-
ronment, including: the Convention of Biological Diversity,29 
Agenda 21,30 the Rio Declaration,31 the Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(the “OSPAR Convention”),32 the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (“EIA”) Guidelines33 and the Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines.34 The precautionary principle provides an essential 
mechanism for considering environmental protection in the 
face of scientific uncertainty, or more accurately the inability 
of scientific modelling to predict, with any certainty, the risk of 
deleterious effects.35 The precautionary principle is particularly 
relevant given the identified vulnerability of the Arctic marine 
environment36 and the dispute amongst environmentalists, scien-
tists and politicians regarding the risk of oil spills, the ‘response 
gap,’37 the effect of oil waste products on the marine environ-
ment, and effective clean-up methods in sea-ice clean-up.38
The precautionary principle is one of four principles on 
which the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines are based, 
and the guidelines require states to ‘widely apply’ it.39 Yet 
the Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines lack evaluation of their 
implementation, monitoring and follow-up procedures. This has 
weakened their capability to set and maintain higher standards.40 
While enforcement of soft law41 is problematic, evaluation, 
monitoring and follow-up mechanisms are more readily car-
ried out, although these mechanisms are insufficient in Arctic 
soft law, perhaps partially due to state resistance and funding 
problems.42
The Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) Guidelines 
identify the need for a precautionary approach in keeping with 
the Rio Declaration’s definition.43 The EIA Guidelines, less 
direct than the Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, state only that 
a precautionary approach is “encouraged” when conducting an 
EIA.44 These Guidelines have seemingly had limited influence 
on practice through a lack of awareness of their existence and a 
lack of follow-up procedures.45
The language of the binding OSPAR Convention46 is 
stronger, and its effect is prima facie more substantial, driven 
by the OSPAR Commission (“OSPARCOM”). OSPAR directs 
Contracting Parties to apply the precautionary principle when 
there are “reasonable grounds for concern”47 with regards to 
inputs that could cause damage to humans or marine flora and 
fauna.48 OSPARCOM also “collect(s) and review(s)”data to 
assess the effects of development on relevant marine environ-
ments.49 This data gathering is key to the success of the OSPAR 
and OSPARCOM and reportedly lowers oil pollution levels 
and raises standards of the state parties.50 A main limitation of 
OSPAR in relation to the Arctic Ocean is that only two of the 
Contracting Parties are Arctic coastal states (Denmark51 and 
Norway) – therefore the OSPAR Convention only covers 8% of 
the surface area of the Arctic Ocean.52 Theoretically the OSPAR 
boundaries could be widened,53 but as the Convention was devel-
oped to support a set maritime area,54 this has not happened.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) has been 
an instrumental framework convention which other international 
law has followed.55 The CBD preamble directs56 parties to adopt 
a precautionary approach, and this is reiterated by Decision II/10 
advocating a “precautionary approach” in the marine environ-
ment.57 As a framework Convention, it has been successful, but 
it does not have the substantive detail required to address the 
salient issues of Arctic offshore development.
The inclusion of the precautionary approach into interna-
tional hard and soft law regulating the Arctic is positive, yet its 
effect is limited. OSPAR only covers a small proportion of the 
Arctic Ocean, the framework Convention CBD lacks substan-
tive detail and only contains this approach within its preamble, 
and the EIA and Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines have 
weak monitoring and follow-up procedures and are soft law. The 
result being that protection of the Arctic Ocean is curtailed: with 
a large response gap58 and questionable clean-up methods little 
supported in the weak interpretation/application of the precau-
tionary principle.
Biological DiversiTy
Marine ecosystems are intricate, and interdependent, so 
damage to part of the food chain can have a catastrophic effect 
on the whole ecosystem.59 In the Arctic Ocean, plankton is a 
key part of the food chain for birds, fish and marine mammals.60 
The Arctic Ocean, with restricted biodiversity and species with 
increased longevity is in particular need of conservation of its 
biological diversity.61
MPAs are identified as an effective way of supporting 
biological diversity yet despite this there are so few MPAs in 
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the Arctic.62 Aiding biological diversity does not automatically 
preclude all offshore development, and MPAs can be designated 
to restrict or prevent certain activities in vulnerable areas.63 Such 
action can support recovery of the wider marine environment.64 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) 
identifies that an “imperfect” MPA, that only limits certain 
activities, is preferable to no MPA.65
The Convention on Biological Diversity66 seeks to conserve 
biodiversity and to support the sustainable development of 
environmental resources. One hundred and ninety-three states 
are parties to the Convention, and it is ratified by all the Arctic 
coastal states except the U.S.A. Article 8 directs parties to con-
sider the creation of protected areas, and in 2004 the Conference 
of Parties identified the need for MPAs as a key way of support-
ing biological diversity.67 The CBD as a framework Convention 
does not provide substantive detail and its requirements are 
“broad and vague, or carefully qualified.”68
The Arctic Council Working Group, Conservation of Arctic 
Flora and Fauna (“CAFF”),69 provides for some monitoring 
and assessment of the Arctic environment and aims to promote 
biological diversity. In 1998, CAFF set up the Circumpolar 
Protected Areas Network (“CPAN”) to support the growth of 
protected areas.70 Unfortunately CPAN became dormant due to 
inner-wrangling and state differences regarding MPAs.71
Another way to support biodiversity is to protect specific 
species that are in decline. There are seventeen varieties of 
cetaceans in the Arctic Ocean including the narwhal, bowheaded 
and beluga whales. Bowheaded whales are an endangered spe-
cies and an oil spill within their territory could have a disas-
trous effect on the species.72 The Exxon Valdez oil spill caused 
mortalities and a continuing decline in whale numbers.73 Polar 
bears, classified as marine mammals, spend most of their life on 
Arctic ice floes, or swimming.74 They have a number of features 
which make them particularly vulnerable to oil pollution. Firstly, 
contamination is magnified along each step of the food chain. 
If a polar bear eats contaminated prey, it also consumes toxic 
levels of hydrocarbons. The ingestion of these hydrocarbons 
can lead to a multiplicity of health problems, and ultimately 
death.75 Secondly, polar bears are a non-migratory species76 and 
they hibernate to cope with food scarcity. When they wake from 
hibernation, if prey is not readily available, as happens in cases 
of large-scale oil pollution, they will not get the nutrients they 
need to survive.77 Thirdly, if oil penetrates the fur of polar bears 
it compromises its insulation, leaving the bear at a heightened 
risk of hypothermia and death.78
In 1946, following an increase in commercial whaling, the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling was 
established. The Convention’s purpose was to conserve whales, 
specifically by regulating the whaling industry.79 In response to 
declining polar bear numbers due to harvesting, the International 
Agreement for the Conservation of Polar Bears was created. 
Article II of the Agreement requires contracting parties to “pro-
tect the ecosystems of which polar bears are a part,”80 paying 
“special attention” to polar bear habitats.81 However, it does not 
preclude exploration.82 Whilst both the International Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling and The International Agreement 
for the Conservation of Polar Bears successfully addressed the 
concerns of whaling and harvesting,83 the newer threat posed by 
offshore oil development has not been addressed.
SuStainable Development
There has been increased interest in Arctic offshore hydro-
carbon activities with high bidding for leases that previously did 
not receive bids due to their remote and potentially hazardous 
locations.84 The Arctic offshore oil industry is experiencing 
rapid growth to meet the demands of world hydrocarbon needs, 
domestic energy security and desired economic growth.85 The 
rate of growth of the Arctic offshore oil industry is predicted to 
rise. The United States Geological Society estimates that ninety-
billion barrels of Arctic oil remain untapped.86
Sustainable development,87 identified as a somewhat fluid 
concept,88 has a classic definition in the Bruntdland report: 
“development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.”89 Sustainable development, conceived at global 
conferences and forums, has been extensively incorporated into 
relevant international legislation.90
The Arctic Council, from its inception as the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”), identified sus-
tainable development in the Arctic as a key objective.91 To 
focus further on sustainable development, the AEPS created 
the Sustainable Development Program, which later evolved 
into the more formal Sustainable Development Working Group 
(“SDWG”).92 Discord amongst Arctic states over the definitions 
and boundaries of sustainable development led to substantial 
delays in devising a programme for the SDWG.93 Consequently 
the SDWG’s focus is somewhat ‘disparate’ and has circumvented 
focusing on several controversial issues.94
Since 1998 under the auspice of the SDWG a number of 
reports have been produced, more recently including the Best 
Practices in Ecosystems-Based Ocean Management report, the 
Arctic Energy report and as part of the International Polar Year 
an energy summit was held (with consequential report), in which 
the Arctic’s offshore oil industry was part of a wider discus-
sion of many energy sources.95 Following changes in the Arctic 
Council chair in 2006 to Norway96 there was clearly a shift 
towards further consideration of the impact of the offshore oil 
industry, however this has had limitations: the SDWG’s Arctic 
Energy report notes that it is “not intended as a comprehensive 
assessment of Arctic energy resources, nor of the impacts of 
Arctic energy development on the natural and human environ-
ments in the circumpolar environment” and is instead a strategic 
report.97
The EIA Guidelines identify that sustainable development 
is the cornerstone principle of the Arctic Council.98 They also 
identify that the key to sustainable development is the inclu-
sion of “traditional knowledge.” 99 The Arctic Offshore Oil and 
Gas Guidelines (created by Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment or “PAME”) identify that offshore oil and gas 
activities in the Arctic should be predicated on the principle of 
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sustainable development.100 The Guidelines direct governments 
to be “mindful of their commitment to sustainable development” 
focusing on eight key issues, including: biological diversity, 
transboundary pollution, and “broad public participation in deci-
sion making.”101 Public participation in EIAs has been criticised 
for being tokenistic, ineffective or untimely.102
The OSPAR Convention identifies in its preamble “that con-
certed action at national, regional and global levels is essential 
to prevent and eliminate marine pollution and to achieve sustain-
able management of the maritime area.”103 OSPAR also refers 
to the need for programs and plans to implement sustainability. 
OSPARCOM identifies “that sustainable development through 
the application of the Ecosystem Approach” is a key principle for 
the North-East Atlantic Environment Strategy and requires that 
“[t]he Contracting parties [ensure][the]involve[ment] of relevant 
stakeholders in the development of their national approaches to 
sustainable uses of the seas.”104
The more advanced implementation, monitoring and 
follow-up procedures of OSPAR better support sustainable 
development. The OSPAR bound countries of Norway and 
Greenland (via Denmark) could help to coerce the other Arctic 
states to consider better integration of sustainable development 
into practice, perhaps via OSPARCOM. The inner-wrangling, 
inefficiencies and procedural problems experienced by SDWG, 
and the lack of follow-up procedures of the EIA and Offshore 
Oil and Gas Guidelines, could be better addressed. They are not 
de facto a problem of all soft law, but rather are problems associ-
ated with the Arctic’s international law.105
EnvironmEntal ProtEction–conclusion
The Arctic Council and working groups have instigated 
many meetings, reports and legislation, which increasingly con-
siders environmental protection via implementation of interna-
tional environmental law concepts and principles. Yet, the Arctic 
Council and its working groups have limited funds, lack enforce-
ment mechanisms, are somewhat thwarted by procedural and 
structural problems and are restrained by States’ desire to main-
tain their sovereign rights to freely exploit natural resources.106
The environmental protection provided by inclusion of 
these international environmental law principles/concepts with 
regards to the offshore oil industry in the Arctic appears insuf-
ficient: the precautionary principle is applied in a diluted form, 
there are still so few MPAs in the Arctic Ocean, species specific 
legislation remains narrow despite new and potential risks from 
the offshore oil industry, and sustainable development favours 
state economic growth providing insufficient consideration to 
distributive justice.
EnvironmEntal JusticE and Human rigHts
The indigenous, Arctic coastal population maintains a 
largely symbiotic relationship with the marine environment: 
some still leading subsistence lifestyles and many others heavily 
relying on the marine environment for food, warmth and cultural 
identity.107 Pollution by the offshore oil industry that damages 
the marine environment would fundamentally interfere with 
indigenous peoples’ lives.108
The environmental justice movement has arisen in response 
to racial and social inequalities that have caused ‘disproportion-
ate environmental burdens.109 Arctic indigenous peoples have 
been described as victims of ‘eco-crime’.110 Dorough states 
that ‘indigenous peoples have been and continue to be victims 
of subjugation, domination and exploitation’.111 Environmental 
justice is a multi-dimensional concept identified as incorporating 
many elements of: distributive,112 procedural,113 recognitive,114 
productive115 and ecological justice.116
intErnational law
International law increasingly addresses Arctic indig-
enous peoples’ human rights in an environmental context 
in: the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,117 the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples118 the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, soft law created by the 
Arctic Council, the inclusion of indigenous peoples in the United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (“UNPFII”), the 
creation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
and the inclusion of six groups of indigenous peoples as perma-
nent participants in the Arctic Council.119
The ILO Convention 169120 is a legally binding piece 
of international legislation setting out minimum standards 
for indigenous rights. It accords distributive and procedural 
elements of environmental justice to indigenous peoples via: 
recognition of cultural diversity,121“ensuring that members of 
these peoples benefit on an equal footing from the rights and 
opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other 
members of the population,”122 and by providing consultation 
and decision-making rights.123 Furthermore, indigenous peoples 
were involved in the creation of this legally binding piece of 
international law.124
Only two of the five Arctic coastal states (Denmark and 
Norway)125 are parties to this Convention. Although, Henriksen 
speculates that “the other Arctic countries cannot ignore the 
comprehensive set of international minimum standards on 
indigenous rights.”126 Unfortunately by failing to ratify this 
Convention it is presumably what they intend to do.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples is a rights-based piece of international legislation that 
proliferates environmental justice. Article 18 states indigenous 
peoples’ “right to participate in decision making in matters 
which would affect their rights,” and Article 32 directs that “(s)
tates shall consult and cooperate with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions . . . to 
obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval 
of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with development, utili-
zation or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.”127 
Both Articles 18 and 32 clearly centralize indigenous peoples’ 
right to the procedural facet of environmental justice with regard 
to any offshore oil development.
The Declaration took decades of deliberations with battling 
over the minutiae of detail, yet minor alterations could have 
substantially weakened its effect. For example, with regards 
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to the issue of “free, prior and informed consent” some states 
wished to substitute “obtain” with “seek.”128 The strength of 
the Declaration is greatly attributed to the participatory role of 
indigenous peoples in its creation.129 This Declaration is seen 
as a crucial step in paving the way to the creation of a binding 
Convention on indigenous rights.130
Other international law also provides Arctic indigenous 
peoples with rights in corollary with their territories and envi-
ronment, including: the non-binding United Nations Conference 
on Environmental and Development (UNCED) Agenda 21,131 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,132 and 
the binding Convention on Biological Diversity.133 In contrast, 
indigenous people were not included in the Ilullissat Declaration 
discussions. Furthermore, the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)134 incorporates a traditional view 
of sovereignty and fails to mention indigenous people’s rights, 
which Rebecca Bratspies sees as “striking a jarring note of dis-
cord with recent developments in international law.”135
Other notable inclusions of indigenous people in inter-
national law and policy making include: The creation in 2000 
of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(“UNPFII”),136 The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, which is relevant to two of the Arctic coastal states, the 
USA and Canada, and the role of indigenous peoples as perma-
nent participants in the Arctic Council.
The Arctic Council is the main forum for inter-governmen-
tal political discussion of Arctic environmental issues and the 
driving force behind the creation of many reports and much 
international soft law.137 Although the presence of the permanent 
participants can be influential the decisions are made with the 
consensus of Arctic Council members states only.138 The funda-
mental doctrine of state sovereignty persists.
There has been huge growth of indigenous peoples’ rights in 
international law via UNDRIP, ILO169, CBD, the soft law of the 
Arctic Council and the inclusion of indigenous peoples in inter-
national forums. Yet, there are limitations on Arctic indigenous 
peoples’ rights. First, after decades of debate, only Norway and 
Denmark139 are parties to ILO169, and Russia is not a party to 
UNDRIP (which is not a binding instrument). Second, the Arctic 
Council’s Permanent Participants do not have voting rights. 
Third, the vulnerable position of the permanent participants can 
be seen by the Russian government’s immediate decision to sus-
pend the work of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples 
of the North (RAIPON) in November 2012.140 RAIPON can no 
longer officially participate in Arctic Council work. Finally, the 
soft law that the Arctic Council creates faces substantial criti-
cism for its poor compliance rates, lack of implementation and 
insufficient monitoring standards.141
The exclusion of indigenous peoples from the Ilulissat 
Declaration’s discussions suggests both reluctance by the five 
coastal states to identify indigenous peoples as on an equal foot-
ing, and their intention not to accede state sovereign rights to 
restraints imposed by international law. There is clearly a gap 
between rhetoric and reality and a reluctance to go beyond this 
impasse.
EnvironmEntal impact assEssmEnts (“Eia”s) and 
EnvironmEntal JusticE
EIAs are a key way of allowing analysis, consultation, 
research142 and public participation. Public participation is, prima 
facie, able to fulfil a critical part of according environmental 
justice to indigenous peoples by providing procedural rights.143 
EIAs are defined by the Espoo Convention as a “national pro-
cedure for evaluating the likely impact of a proposed activity 
on the environment.”144 The CBD Guidelines, Arctic Offshore 
Oil and Gas Guidelines and EIA Guidelines all include broad 
boundaries of what the EIA process should involve: including 
impact on “human-health” and the importance of incorporating 
traditional (and other local) knowledge.145
International legislation regulating the Arctic has embraced 
the EIA concept. The Espoo Convention (addressing trans-
boundary EIAs for offshore hydrocarbon activities)146 has forty-
five Contracting Parties, of which only Canada, Denmark and 
Norway are Arctic coastal states.147 The EIA Guidelines and 
the Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines provide Arctic-specific 
guidance: identifying features of the Arctic’s cryosphere and 
eco-system that demand consideration.148 The Offshore Oil and 
Gas Guidelines attempt more stringent regulation of transbound-
ary impacts than the standards set by the Espoo Convention.149 
UNCLOS requires states to conduct an assessment for hydrocar-
bon activities although as a framework the Convention does not 
provide substantive detail.150
The Espoo Convention requires adherence to public partici-
pation procedures although it does not elaborate on the form that 
this participation should take, or the stage at which it should be 
instigated.151 Koivurova states that the lack of detail regarding the 
form and timing of public participation makes this Convention 
“considerably weakened.”152 The Espoo Convention’s153 strong 
institutional arrangements provide a forum for effective follow-
up procedures, prescribing that there should be regular reviews 
for implementation;154 the last such meeting was in Geneva 
in June 2011.155 The Espoo Convention is praised for setting 
detailed procedural standards and for creating what “seems to 
have become a global standard for how to conduct TEA.”156 Yet it 
is criticized for not having harmonized standards of EIAs across 
contracting states in practice and therefore potentially causing 
problems of reciprocity.157 As only three of the five coastal states 
are parties to this Convention, its ability to harmonize legislation 
governing the Arctic Ocean is limited.158
PAME’s Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines identify the 
importance of “full and meaningful” public participation,159 
but do not provide substantive detail on this issue. The EIA 
Guidelines, although more detailed, identify the importance of 
incorporation of traditional knowledge into the EIA process 
from initial exploration stages and throughout the exploitation 
process.160 However, they are often criticized for lacking imple-
mentation, having poor follow-up evaluation procedures,161 and 
a study identified that key parties were not even aware of the 
existence of these Guidelines.162
In practice there are examples of Arctic public participation 
falling far short of standards international legislation aspires 
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to achieve. In the United States, the villagers of Kaktouik (the 
nearest community to prospective development in the US sector 
of the Beaufort Sea) felt that their views were sought so late in 
the process that they did not actually influence or alter practice 
and that it was a tokenistic process.163 These villagers wished to 
raise technical concerns but instead Shell provided public rela-
tion employees to answer these technical concerns.164 Similarly 
Canadian Inuits have criticised public participation in the region 
as insufficient and untimely.165 Steiner also commented that “the 
general public is asked to review and comment on an overwhelm-
ing stream of technically complex documents, but is outmatched 
by well-paid industry advocates.”166 The offshore industry 
presents a different picture – one where they seek “consent” 
rather than mere consultation and where they, in response to 
indigenous people’s requests, 
stopped operations for a two-
week period “to enable locals 
to carry out their subsistence 
hunting during the whaling 
season.”167
The indigenous peoples 
of the Arctic are not of only 
one opinion with regards to 
offshore activities but they are 
united in supporting the need 
for continued, and ongoing, 
involvement of indigenous 
peoples in the international 
debates, and at a local level, their involvement in each and every 
planned development.168 Examples of inadequate involvement 
in decision-making and insufficient information provisions are 
examples of environmental injustice.
EnvironmEntal ProtEction and EnvironmEntal 
JusticE – conflicting concEPts?
The environmental movement in the Arctic has historically 
alienated the indigenous population.169 In the 1970s and 80s, 
Greenpeace launched a campaign against seal hunting that 
Greenland’s indigenous peoples found offensive, inaccurate and 
damaging.170 There were later objections to Greenpeace’s attack 
on indigenous peoples whaling.171 While Arctic indigenous peo-
ples are described as victims of “eco-crime(s),” environmental-
ists are perceived as having done little to pursue this injustice.172 
In turn, Indigenous peoples often appear keen to maintain their 
distance from the environmental movement.173
To consider whether environmental protection and envi-
ronmental justice mutually drive up standards or conflict, this 
paper focuses on sustainable development and EIAs. Sustainable 
development, in balancing economic growth with environmental 
protection, is potentially at odds with environmental justice.174 
The indigenous coastal communities risk environmental costs 
yet share little of the economic benefits.175 Often large propor-
tions of high paid offshore oil industry jobs do not go to local 
people176 but instead to skilled, experienced workers outsourced 
from other areas.177 Also, complex revenue systems for offshore 
industries can mean minimal local benefits; for example, in 
Alaska beyond six miles offshore the revenues gained go entirely 
to the federal government with no share going to the state of 
Alaska.178 The Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez disasters 
illustrate the level of damage that oil pollution can cause to local 
fishing and tourism industries, sustainable lifestyles and the 
environment.179 Despite a $2.5 billion clean-up operation, less 
than 10% of the spilled Exxon Valdez oil was recovered from the 
water and shore.180 Twenty years later, the damage to organisms 
and their marine environment is still apparent.181 Immediate 
sizeable effects from the Exxon Valdez spill were obvious, with 
estimated mortalities of 2,800-5,000 sea otters, 250,000-700,000 
seabirds, 300 harbour seals, 250 bald eagles, 22 killer whales 
and billions of herring and salmon eggs.182
Indigenous peoples state 
that both the offshore industry 
and central governments do 
not adequately consider their 
lack of economic benefits, or 
the potentially devastating 
risks they face: This is at odds 
with the distributive element 
of environmental justice.183 
Sustainable development is 
identified as an “unabashedly 
anthropocentric concept,”184 
yet this does not provide the 
full picture, for it can con-
ceivably fail to duly consider certain groups of people. It is not 
however automatically a concept that excludes distributive ele-
ments; it has only been deconstructed and interpreted in this way 
in the Arctic region.185 The concept of sustainable development 
demands consideration of future generations and can therefore 
be viewed as potentially distributive, and not at odds with envi-
ronmental justice. Careful reframing of sustainable development 
in the Arctic context is needed to allow due consideration of 
indigenous peoples and to provide environmental justice.
The second issue is whether EIAs potentially cause conflict 
between environmental justice and environmental protection. If 
the EIAs of offshore oil projects provide sufficient procedural 
mechanisms for indigenous peoples’ involvement and deci-
sion-making, they could be seen as complying with principles 
of environmental justice. Given that environmental protection 
does not ipso facto demand restriction on all development, it 
is not necessarily at odds with environmental justice.186 EIAs 
can potentially drive up standards of environmental protection 
and comply with the procedural requirements of environmental 
justice.
conclusion
There has been substantial growth in international law 
according rights to indigenous peoples, illustrating that indig-
enous peoples are no longer “passive observers to fundamental 
decisions being made about [their] homeland.”187 Yet they are 
now somewhat locked into the rhetoric of international politics 
The environmental 
movement in the Arctic has 
historically alienated the 
indigenous population.
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and law-making. Increasingly there has been inclusion of key 
international environmental law principles and concepts into 
relevant international law. Yet the ability of the inclusion of these 
principles and concepts to drive up standards of environmental 
protection has been limited. There is a deadlock created by the 
tension between state sovereign rights to utilise natural resources, 
environmental protection, and the rights of indigenous peoples.
The five coastal states, undeterred by the soft law created 
and unfettered by international hard law they have not ratified,188 
delineate themselves with traditional ideas of sovereign rights 
in order to utilise natural resources unabated. The exponential 
growth in recognition of indigenous rights regarding their envi-
ronments and the growing recognition of environmental protec-
tion in international law certainly provides a beacon of hope for 
the future, but at the present the offshore oil industry continues 
to grow far beyond the capacity of international law.
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